H istory and philosophy are often bedded down together in academic faculties, as they are within the organisation of the RANZCP. This is not so within the British Royal College of Psychiatrists, where the Sections for the History of Psychiatry and for the Philosophy of Psychiatry are separate entities with different memberships.
As academic humanities, these two disciplines are categorised apart from the natural sciences because of their preoccupation with human culture and because they share methodologies of criticism and speculation. However, there are important differences between them that deserve the attention of psychiatrists. Crudely stated, history is mainly focussed on data and philosophy is mainly on process.
John Bowlby had important things to say about the place of history within science and within the practice of psychiatry. The reader will note that Bowlby intends to reallocate history within the sciences by repeatedly employing the term historical sciences: 1 Invaluable though scientific method is as a way of obtaining relatively reliable knowledge, resolving differences of opinion and making useful predictions, its limitations are considerable. One is that science deals in generalities but has little to say about singular specific events. and History… whether it deals with society or persons or ideas, is always concerned with an appallingly complex series of highly specific interacting events which no amount of science can enable us to explain adequately, let alone predict. Thus the distinction between the natural sciences and the historical sciences is not that they use a different method of obtaining knowledge but that the problems that they strive to understand and the criteria that they adopt are quite different. One is concerned to formulate general laws in terms of probabilities, the other to understand singular specific events in as much detail as possible. 1 In the above paragraph, Bowlby might be writing about the singularity of the advent of prefrontal lobotomy in Sydney during the second half of the 1940s. This is the subject of two papers in this issue of Australasian Psychiatry. 2, 3 This advent will never be repeated and no amount of empirical science will predict or explain its occurrence or its consequences. Importantly also, there is no way that a 21 st century psychiatrist might anticipate or understand the existence of a law in New South Wales that prevents deep brain stimulation for psychiatric disorders without knowing the history of psychosurgery in Sydney between the late 1940s and the late 1970s. 4 The two papers in this issue of AP 2,3 deal only with the earliest phase of that story, but the reader might conclude that the whole saga commenced as a highstakes experiment with great attendant risks.
In his essay Plumbing, philosophy and psychiatry, 5 Stephen Rosenman writes that most of what is written about the philosophy of psychiatry is "out of sight or reach of practicing psychiatrists". However, for the psychiatrist who accepts an obligation to identify and remove her professional deficiencies, Rosenman's critique deserves attention.
Rosenman argues that the clinical and research enterprise that we call psychiatry is (a) unsatisfactory, and (b) that this is because of the flimsiness of the scientific base that supports it. Rosenman proposes (c) that the main problem is philosophical and a desirable path to rectification is to improve our philosophical competence. He concludes (d) that we should enlist the cooperation of professional philosophers.
A psychiatrist might agree with Rosenman's first proposition (a) but add the caveat that most human enterprises are far less than ideal. She might also agree with his second proposition (b) but question whether Rosenman's examples -the poor state of our current nosology, or the problems with the ontology of depression -provide sufficient evidence that psychiatry is in dire straits. However, if she agrees (c) that urgent rectification is needed, she might ponder Rosenman's specific solution (d) "…we need professional philosophers where we are most likely to embed our existing beliefs, confusions and dogmatisms into the profession's future". 5 She might consider the reality that professional philosophers vary greatly in their areas of professional interest, their passions and their methodologies. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper were both vitally concerned with the philosophy of science, but were so diametrically and violently opposed in their approaches to philosophical issues that any attempt at dialogue between them was bound to be fruitless. 6 In his millennial address to scientists at the Royal Society, another celebrated philosopher, John Searle, listed six problem areas in science where philosophers were very active. 7 collaboration be structured? Are there other ways to improve the quality of philosophical discourse within psychiatry? Should we educate psychiatrists to be better philosophers? Should we also encourage greater participation of psychiatrist-philosophers like German Berrios, Nassir Ghaemi and John Sadler in our major deliberations? If not, why not?
The RANZCP has recently adopted a more strategic approach to recognise and encourage leaders from within its fellowship, to ensure ongoing improvement in the management of mental health and general wellbeing in Australasia. In the October podcast, I speak with Associate Professor Greg De Moore of Westmead Hospital about his book Finding Sanity: John Cade, lithium, and the taming of bipolar disorder. Professor De Moore describes John Cade as the most influential psychiatrist in Australia's history due to his role as the herald of the age of psychopharmacology. John Cade's demonstration that lithium could greatly improve the symptoms of patients with bipolar affective disorder was a necessary first step towards the end of the asylum system, as well as the development of more effective and humane alternatives for serious mental illness than older treatments such as psychosurgery, early electroconvulsive therapy, and psychoanalysis. Professor De Moore also discusses how the art of biography allows him to use the story of a fascinating life to reach beyond the academic psychiatric audience to engage the general population in a greater awareness of the history of psychiatry and the nature of mental illness.
Cover art
The cover art by Donna Lawrence entitled Psychiatry in some hands comes from the Cunningham Dax Collection. The artwork has been chosen to reflect the need to critically evaluate our practices. This issue's focus on history, psychiatric rating scales and critical analysis (in the selftest question section) reminds us of the importance of evaluating the decisions that we "take into our own hands" when we care for our patients. The artist says this about her artwork:
My use of an embryonic figure symbolises the individual's innate strength and ability to guard against elements that may hurt or damage the physical, and thus mental, body. This painting, through symbols such as ψ, the Greek letter psi used here as a symbol for psychiatry, also makes reference to those who seek to take away the individual's perfectly adequate coping and management skills and replace them with something alien.
About the Cunningham Dax Collection
The Cunningham Dax Collection consists of over 15,000 artworks created by people with an experience of mental illness and/or psychological trauma. The art includes works on paper, paintings, photographs, poems, textiles, sculpture, journals and digital media.
